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Research concerning basic needs in the human rights literature has consistently
found a positive and significant relationship between measures of wealth and basic needs
provision.  This study utilizes a relatively new measure of economic freedom to test
hypotheses regarding general macro-economic policy decisions and basic needs
outcomes.  A pooled dataset of 138 countries over four years is examined using ordinary
least squares panel regression, controlling for both ‘year’ and ‘country,’ in a standard
basic needs model.  Consistent and systematic differences between members of the
Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD
nations are revealed. The Index of Economic Freedom1 has both theoretical and empirical
advantages over previous measures of wealth and economic freedom, allowing human
rights scholars to test specific economic policy decisions as they affect basic needs
outcomes.
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The cover story of the August 2001 issue of The Economist addresses the growing
concern among many economists that human rights advocates are gearing up for a major
assault on countries that refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of economic and social
rights.  The article is striking in its placement on the cover of a magazine not known for
its human rights concerns; it symbolizes the new phase the human rights debate has
entered.  Spawned by Amnesty International’s (AI) internal debate on whether to include
economic and social rights in their fight against rights abuse, the article weighs the costs
and benefits of accepting economic rights arguments.
In the end, the author rejects economic rights arguments on the grounds that
claims stemming from these rights would be counterproductive to any meaningful gains
in development; the costs of guaranteeing health and education would be too high (2001,
19-21).   More specifically, the author advises Amnesty International not to include
economic and social rights in their mandate, claiming it would erode their political capital
in the international community.
A week after The Economist cover story was published, Amnesty International
did in fact change its mandate to encompass both physical and mental integrity.  They
explicitly state the purpose for this change: “It enables us to tackle some abuses of
economic, social and cultural rights, and to focus more effectively on the main human
rights concerns in different countries, unconstrained by the limits of the previous
mandate” (The Wire 2001).  With this single change, one of the most powerful human
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rights groups in the world signaled a new commitment to the universal nature of rights to
education, health care, and other social goods.  Depending on whom you listen to, this
move could begin the final push for recognition of all parts of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, or it could be the beginning of the end for AI’s international
legitimacy.  In this paper I examine where some synthesis might occur between many
economists and the human rights community on realizing human rights goals.
The globalization movement of the last century, with its characteristic transfers of
information, culture, raw materials, philosophy, and wealth to new populations of the
world, has created a unique set of problems and opportunities for human rights scholars
to address.  Some of the current problems that distinguish the field include (but are not
limited to) finding the legal and moral foundations for international human rights norms,
expanding the liberal-democratic idea of rights to all humans regardless of their culture,
and lastly, delivering what Jack Donnelly calls the “objects” of rights claims (1989, 11).
This third difficulty, how to best ‘deliver the goods,’ is the subject of this study.  By
addressing this problem I hope to reveal an array of opportunities for human rights
scholars.
This paper has two goals, one theoretical and one empirical.  The theoretical goal
is to open up the black box of wealth and try to discover what macro-economic policy
choices lead to better basic needs outcomes.  Theoretically, gross national product (GNP)
per capita and other traditional wealth measures yield very little in the way of economic
policy prescriptions.  In sum, they advise countries to simply ‘get rich’ in order to attain
better subsistence outcomes.  There are many ways to get rich however: discover oil,
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mine for diamonds or gold, take out international loans, or possibly reduce government
restrictions on the economy.  I will introduce a measure of economic freedom that allows
us to test this last hypothesis.  In doing so, I hope that human rights scholars will have
more to say about macro-economic policy choices.
The second goal of this paper is to ‘test-drive’ this new theoretical tool.
Empirically, does the measure test what we want it to test?  Is it a good measure of
macro-economic policy choices, and (more importantly) does it perform as well or better
than typical wealth measures used to explain basic needs outcomes.  I am not arguing for
replacing controls for wealth in human rights research.  Rather, I am offering a new way
to test theories about subsistence performance, and also a measure that will allow us to
say more about when open markets might help and when they might hurt.  Knowing the
possible harmful effects of market failures, inequities, and economic discrimination that
can occur in free markets, we might also use this measure to discover when open
economies produce good outcomes and when they do not.
Macro-Economic Policy and Basic Human Needs
The modern human rights movement began in earnest after World War II, with
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) treaty, adopted in 1948 (United
Nations General Assembly [UN GA] 1948).  Along with the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESPR), and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the UDHR forms the legal basis of the international
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human rights movement. Governments voluntarily1 sign agreements to protect a certain
list of specific rights.  Some of the more common rights listed among these documents
and many other regional agreements include: the right to life, liberty and the security of
person (UDHR, UN GA 1948), the right to self-determination (ICESCR and the ICCPR)
(UN GA 1966), and the right to be free from torture and cruel and degrading punishment
(ICCPR).  Subsistence rights are spelled out in the ICESPR and provide the policy goals
central to this study.
Articles 12 and 13 of the ICESPR describe the nature and range of subsistence
needs.  These needs are considered basic in the sense that the outcomes described are
fundamental to an individual’s survival and dignity (UN GA 1966).  For this analysis, I
assume that both human rights scholars and policy makers value the outcomes of these
rights.  Regardless of the acceptance or non-acceptance of these rights as guarantees, both
sides agree that people should have access to basic health care, basic education, and basic
food and shelter (in a sense, it is an argument over means, not ends).  Jack Donnelley
explains that the rights argument focuses on whether regimes should be held accountable
for failed policy (not providing these goods at all costs), or conversely, whether these
goods can be provided without being guaranteed by law.  This paper seeks to test the
notion that aside from claims of justice, “To what degree are outcomes provided by
different macro-economic policy choices” (Donnelley 1989, 38-39)?
                                                 
1 The amount of truly voluntary action in the international arena is getting harder to distinguish.  Most
countries are coerced into certain behaviors in the pursuit of investment and capital, as well as political
legitimacy.
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The impetus for this study is a paper by Milner, Poe and Leblang (1999), in which
they analyze the interaction of political rights, security rights, subsistence needs, and
economic rights.  One of the measures they utilize for their analysis is the Fraser
Institute’s Economic Freedom Index.2  They show that over the past fifteen years,
economic freedom, measured as the amount of government intervention in the economy,
has grown internationally.  More importantly, they planted the seed for the present
analysis by stating, “If the argument holds from the previous section that increased levels
of GNP result in higher physical quality of life, then economic freedom could, at least
indirectly, have an affect on basic human needs” (416).  However, the authors could not
directly test this hypothesis with the Fraser Institute’s measure because it is only
constructed in five-year intervals.  I hope the present analysis provides this test.
Instead of the Fraser scale I will utilize a similar measure created by the Heritage
Foundation, which has been generated for every year since 1995.
Research on basic needs attainment has shown repeatedly that increased levels of
wealth, or financial growth, lead to increased basic needs provision (Dixon and Moon
1987, Milner et al. 1999, Moon and Dixon 1985, 1992, Park 1987, Poe et al. 2000, Shue
1980) Wealth measures appear to stand up empirically no matter what political concept is
being tested.   The interaction between economic freedom and wealth then provides the
link between economic freedom and basic needs attainment.  By getting at what is
                                                 
2 Economic Freedom Network Index Copyright The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, BC,
http://www.freetheworld.com/download.html.
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driving increased levels of GNP per capita measures, we are supplied with a tool that is
both theoretically and empirically more valuable than those previously available.
Liberal/capitalist theorists argue that free markets and property rights protections
increase investment (Gwartney et al. 2000), spur research and innovation, and create
wealth (Berger 1986, Friedman 1988, Leblang 1996, Olson 1996, Scully 1992).  The
substantive theory behind free market growth is that individuals release latent labor and
social capital when they are given incentives to do so.  This will be discussed further in
the section concerning the Heritage measure of economic freedom, but for now it is
important to highlight that there is a large amount of theory that points to a connection
between increases in economic freedom, growth (wealth), and basic needs attainment.  I





To test the hypotheses concerning economic freedom and basic human needs I
analyze a cross-section of 138 nations over a four-year time period.  The sample is
limited for a number of reasons.  First, the Heritage Foundation has only recently begun
to assess nations using their Index of Economic Freedom3.  Thus, the information using
this measure is only available for the years 1994 through 2001.  This ‘floor’ limits any
analysis to 1994 onward.
The Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index4 is available for the years 1975
through 1999.  This measure may be superior to the Heritage Index in both depth and
breadth (see Milner, Poe and Leblang 1999), but it is currently calculated at five-year
intervals, leaving analysts with fewer time points (5 points; 1975-1995) and little
theoretical substance for explaining economic changes over five-year periods.  Also, the
two scales are significantly correlated (using 1995 numbers), which allows for confidence
in using the Heritage Index instead.
As the Heritage Index limits the back end of this analysis, so too do the World
Bank data limit the front end.  The World Bank’s 2001 World Development Indicators5
has consistent data to 1999 only.  Furthermore, the data on military expenditures ends at
1997, cutting the sample size to its current scope of 138 countries and four years.  The
                                                 
3 The Index of Economic Freedom, Copyright The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC,
http://www.heritage.org/index/2002.
4 Economic Freedom Network Index Copyright The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, BC,
http://www.freetheworld.com/download.html.
5 World Development Indicators, Copyright The World Bank Group, Washington, DC,
http://www.worldbank.org/.
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methodological problems involved with using such a shallow pool will be addressed
later, but the leverage gained by using a panel sample relative to a cross-section analysis
are large enough to merit the technique.
Dependent Variable: The Physical Quality of Life Index
In the July 1996 issue of Scientific American, two maps highlight a short article
showing the world in 1960 and in 1990.  The maps are color-coded to show a change in
the level of world development measured with three indicators: infant mortality, life
expectancy at age one, and literacy at age 15 (1996, 28).  The maps dramatically illustrate
the apparent change for the better the world had gone through in this thirty-year period.
The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), developed by Morris David Morris
for the Overseas Development Council, has been a topic of debate ever since its public
debut in 1979 (Morris 1979).  Its use in this study follows the human rights literature,
which has generally accepted this measure as the best available indicator of basic needs
provision (Moon 1991, Hicks and Streeten 1979, Larson and Wilford 1979).  The literacy
rate specifies the distribution of basic education in a country.  The infant mortality rate
and life expectancy at age one indicate the level of health care and the amount of
available food and potable water available.  The literature is ripe with debates over this
measurement, but it is adequately accepted, in the words of Henry Shue, as “one
relatively straightforward way to quantify the extent to which a number of subsistence
needs are being fulfilled (Shue 1996, 6).6
                                                 
6 For a comprehensive discussion of the PQLI and its problems see also: Dixon and Moon (1986) Milner,
Poe, and Leblang (1999), Morris David Morris (1979), Moon and Dixon (1992), Moon and Dixon (1985),
Moon (1991), Poe, Tan, and Miller (2000), Rosh (1986).  See Appendix A for an in-depth explanation of
the scale construction.
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The PQLI has a history very similar to the one being traced out in this paper for
the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom.  Amazingly, it also took the place of Gross
National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita measures as a
gauge of “social development.”  As Hicks and Streeten chronicle in their article
“Indicators of Development: The Search for a Basic Needs Yardstick,” development
scholars in the seventies were looking for a better theoretical indicator of human welfare
(1979).  They write, “The heavy emphasis on GNP, GNP per head, and their growth
rates, as the principle performance test (not normally as the ‘objective’) of development
was based on doubtful assumptions” (567).  They go on to note that GNP and GDP per
capita measures are aggregate measures that do not capture the distributive tendencies
within a nation.  These qualities led them to examine four alternative measures of
development, one of them being the PQLI.  Hicks and Streeten conclude that while PQLI
has its drawbacks, it is a step in the right direction to supplementing GNP per capita
measures, most importantly because it is theoretically more substantive.
Explanatory Variable: The Index of Economic Freedom
As described above, the main purpose of this study is to open the black box of
GNP per capita measures (and its various cousins: GDP per capita, Gross National
Income (GNI) per capita etc.).  Through some process, states are turning wealth into
basic human needs.  But the question of “How?” still remains.  Do governments take the
profits from oil or diamonds or poppy seeds and mail each citizen a check for $300.00?
Or, do wealthy property owners go around to the needy parts of the nation and open free
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hospitals and schools in the altruistic hope that they will produce healthier citizens?
Probably not.
The Heritage Foundation is a conservative/libertarian think tank that analyzes
policy and releases studies asserting the virtues of the free market.  Their motive for
constructing the index is clear; they don’t like government intervention in the economic
arena.7  However, this should not preclude scholarly use of the measure, as long as they
are up front about their methods and use ‘objective’ as opposed to subjective judgments
to make their scale.  In short, we may disagree with the manner in which the scale is
constructed (that is open for debate), but if the results are replicable using available data
and the index tests what we wish to test, then the fact that the data emanate from a biased
source should not be a problem.  It is important then to see how the index is constructed.
The Heritage Foundation provides a detailed account of the methods used to
construct the Index of Economic Freedom.8  Generally, fifty economic variables are
broken up into 10 categories of government separation from the economy.  They are:
Trade Policy, Fiscal Burden of Government, Government Intervention in the Economy,
Monetary Policy, Capital Flows and Foreign Investment, Banking and Finance, Wages
and Prices, Property Rights, Regulation, and Black Market Activity.  Each category is
averaged on a scale from 1 to 5, where a 5 corresponds to the environment least
conducive to economic freedom, and a 1 corresponds to the most conducive environment
                                                 
7 This is not that different from the normative reasoning behind constructing scales of democracy.  Scholars
do not like authoritarian regimes and have found a way to measure the oppressiveness of a regime based on
democratic values.
8 For a look at the entire measurement process, please see
http://www.heritage.org/index/2002/chapters/chap5.html
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for economic freedom.  All ten categories are then averaged (un-weighted) producing an
Economic Freedom score that ranges from 1 to 5 for each country (O’Driscoll et al.
2002).
This is not the place to analyze the measure in-depth, but it is important to note
that the Heritage Foundation does not use any wealth measure in this index.  The
inclusion of a GNP or GDP measure in the index would obviously bias the present
analysis in favor of the economic freedom variable.  The exclusion of wealth in the index
is theoretically important as well.  It says that regardless of the economic status of a
country, the government can make policy choices to restrict economic activity or let the
markets function in a freer environment.  I will discuss one portion of the index to
highlight the theory behind its hypothesized effects on basic human needs attainment.
Factor #8 in the Index of Economic Freedom is “Property Rights.”  The right to
own and labor on your own property is one of the fundamental tenets of liberalism.  From
Adam Smith to John Locke, private property is considered to be the most important
foundation upon which to build a free society (Locke 1997, Hanke and Walters 1997,
Berger 1986).  The Heritage Foundation explains this concept more succinctly:
The ability to accumulate private property is the main motivating force in
a market economy, and the rule of law is vital to a fully functioning free-
market economy. Secure property rights give citizens the confidence to
undertake commercial activities, save their income, and make long-term
plans because they know that their income is safe from expropriation
(O’Driscoll et al. 2002, Chapter 5).
The link to increased levels of investment and market activity due to strong
property laws is found throughout the literature (Gastil 1984, Hanke and Walters 1997,
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Leblang 1996).  The Heritage Foundation measures the degree to which a regime protects
private property using the following factors:
1) Freedom from government influence over the judicial system
2) Commercial code defining contracts
3) Sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes
4) Government expropriation of property
5) Corruption within the judiciary
6) Delays in receiving judicial decisions
7) Legally granted and protected private property
Countries are rated on a scale of one to five based on how well they perform these
functions.
How does more strict property protection translate into better health care and
better education?  This is the black box within the black box.  The easy answer is of
course is that “the invisible hand” of capitalism stimulates investors to provide needed
goods to consumers who demand it.  This is hard to disentangle however, and the
problem highlights one of the shortcomings of this analysis.  There is no real, hard
evidence that more economic freedom will directly lead to better (and wider) health care
provision, subsistence food and shelter, and education.  Anecdotal evidence and intuition
provide strong support for this connection however.
For states that are on the low end of the PQLI scale, we would expect that even
small amounts of economic policy shifts (towards more open economies) would increase
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investment and stimulate growth.  This investment and growth in turn increases the need
for a better-educated workforce and consumer base.  Secondly, we can postulate that the
profit motive combined with the inherent altruistic motives of education and health care
providers allows for the distribution of higher amounts of basic needs to more people.
Perhaps the energy and motivation for providing subsistence needs is latent in under-
developed countries, and economic freedom (beginning with property rights protection)
is the vehicle through which they are unleashed.  Again this theory is difficult to
disentangle from democratic and development theory, but it makes intuitive sense.  This
is in fact why the Heritage Index is so valuable, perhaps it can assist in getting rid of the
“magic pony” explanation for basic needs provision through increases in wealth.
Lastly, we need to consider the critics of economic freedom.  Perhaps, as is
argued by many liberals and Neo-Marxists, economic freedom simply leads to economic
discrimination and exploitation.  This is just as plausible as the capitalist explanation.
We do not even need to look outside the United States to find that free markets can have
deleterious effects on those who have been unfortunate enough to be born into poor
families.  In what is considered one of the most free and advanced countries of the world,
we have yet to deal with systematic political and economic discrimination against
minorities and the poor in a sufficient manner.  The Heritage Foundation argues that we
need to open U.S. markets further to address these problems (Utt 2001).  By controlling
for wealthy industrialized countries, we can test these hypotheses using their own
measure.  I will discuss this later in the paper.
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Democracy
I control for political institutional arrangements with the Freedom House measure
of political rights.9  This democracy measure is a very good indicator of the level of
political rights enjoyed by a country’s citizens.  In a real sense this is the political version
of the economic freedom measure in that it taps into the extent of self-rule enjoyed by
citizens.  There are two important reasons why democracy should be positively
associated with basic human needs attainment.  First, democratic governments must be
responsive to voters to some degree.  Democratic regimes that do not bring about
increased subsistence levels run the risk of getting thrown out of power.  It is much easier
for authoritarian regimes to continue to deprive their people of basic needs when there is
no democratic challenge for control of the state.
Secondly, democracy mobilizes groups to petition for change.  Individual citizens
become motivated to act for political solutions to problems when they are given political
control.  Social problems like low education levels, bad health care, and food and water
shortages become more tractable when groups are activated to propose and work towards
solutions.  In short, regimes become more aware of long-term solutions to problems when
they are held accountable during periodic elections, and individuals become problem-
solvers when they feel they have the power to make a difference.  These democratic shifts
have a strong impact on social goods like basic human needs (Leblang 1996; Moon and
                                                 
9 Copyright Freedom House, Washington, DC, http://www.freedomhouse.org/.   For a list of the factors
used to construct the Freedom House scale, please see Appendix B.
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Dixon 1985; Moon 1991; Huntington 1991; Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Rueschemeyer et al.
1992; Rosh 1986).
While many measures of democracy are available, Jaggers and Gurr note that
despite the different measurements, all democracy scales are highly correlated (1995,
470).  The Polity IV dataset10 developed by Jaggers and Gurr is the other scale used in
the field, but the Freedom House measure was available for more countries so I chose it
for my analysis. Initial tests involving the Polity IV scale do not appear to affect the
results reported here.
Lastly, the Freedom House scale measures both political rights and civil liberties
using two indices that range from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic).  I use only
the political rights scale for this analysis because the civil liberties scale includes a
measure of ‘property rights,’ which is one of the factors addressed in the Index of
Economic Freedom.  Including both measures would increase the already high degree of
collinearity in the model.   
Military Expenditures
Studies looking at the impact of military expenditures and military personnel in
the human rights field have produced mixed results.  Dixon and Moon (1987) find that
military expenditures divided by GNP per capita are significant negative determinants of
basic needs provision (PQLI).  Conversely, they conclude that military manpower
                                                 
10Copyright Polity IV Project. 2000. Polity IV Dataset. [Computer file; version p4v2000] College Park,
MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm
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(measured as military participation divided by population) has a positive impact on basic
needs provision.  These differing results, and the two competing theories concerning the
effects of the military on its citizens are the reason that the hypothesis for this variable is
non-directional.  I will briefly explain why.11    
Military training is seen to have a welfare effect on the poor and middle classes,
as they are the ones who generally benefit from the discipline, ideology, and skills
learned there (Dixon and Moon 1987, 662-664).  The higher the percent of the population
in the military, it is hypothesized, the greater the number of families that are benefiting
from the military lifestyle.  Secondly, as military expenditures rise, the economy becomes
stimulated by a mobilization of resources.
Conversely, the more a government spends on the military, the less it spends on
social welfare programs to provide basic needs.  As Dixon and Moon note however, there
is strong interdependence between ‘spending’ and ‘manpower’ both theoretically and
methodologically (1987, 662-667). In order to tap into government policy choices, I have
chosen to use military spending as a percentage of the government budget.  Theoretically,
this measure is richer because it is a direct indicator of both military involvement and
government preference for a military regime.  Fluctuations in the economy and other
shocks could mask dynamics present in military spending if military expenditures are
taken as a proportion of GNP.  However, when taken as a percentage of the government’s
budget, military expenditures become real policy choices in the tradeoff between welfare
                                                 
11 For a detailed explanation of these theories, please see Dixon and Moon (1987), Rosh (1986), Poe and
Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999).
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and defense.  The problem with this variable (discussed previously) is that it is not
available for many country-years, thus reducing the sample size by a third.
Population
I hypothesize that as a state’s population grows, it becomes harder for
governments to provide needed education, health care, food, and water to its people.
Larger populations present a tractability problem in that countries like India and China
may have a harder logistical battle to fight than smaller countries with better economies
of scale.  I am unsure about the direction for this variable, but past human rights research
leads me to expect a negative relationship.
GNP per capita and OECD Membership
Lastly, I control for the amount of development that has already occurred in a
state.  Obviously any development analysis performed in the twenty-first century must
take into account the differing levels of economic development already present in the
world.  Traditionally, this has been the reason for including wealth measures in studies of
basic human needs.  This inclusion takes on further significance in the present study
because I want to compare wealth measures to economic freedom.
Up to this point I have not argued that wealth measures should be replaced by
economic freedom measures.  Rather, I have argued that we need to open up the black
box of wealth, and test whether economic freedom has independent effects on the
attainment of subsistence needs.  In order to do so, the model must contain both measures
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to see how they perform in the presence of one another.  This will certainly force us to be
cautious with issues of collinearity, but these issues will be dealt with in the analysis
section.
The Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development is a group of
(currently) 30 states that share policy information for the express purpose of creating
more democratic and capitalist societies.  Membership in this exclusive group is a good
indicator that a country has ‘made it’ in the area of development.  The inclusion of this
dummy variable is important for two reasons.  First, more than GNP per capita, it
controls for the amount of both political and economic wealth a country enjoys.
Secondly, the variable allows us to separate the countries of the world into two
broad but distinct groups, industrialized democracies and non-industrialized systems.  It
is tenable that these two groups will perform differently in all aspects of development,
and that they should be analyzed separately.  In fact, a look at Table 1 shows that the
means and standard deviations (not to mention the minimum and maximum values) of all
variables are different for OECD and non-OECD countries.  A difference of means test
for these groups confirms this expectation.  The means are significantly different for all
variables (save population) at a 99 percent confidence level.  Of course there are some
non-OECD countries that could be included in the “industrialized democracies” category,
but this control is more than sufficient for this analysis.
There are reasons to expect that OECD countries would not be affected by
changes in democracy or economic freedom as much as non-OECD countries.
Theoretically, these nations are already ‘developed’ in all sense of the term.  Neo-
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Marxists might argue that it is precisely in these countries that economic discrimination
will accompany more open markets.  If Sweden and Germany were to open their health
care professions to free market mechanisms, it is plausible that they would experience a
decrease in basic needs provision.  The same is possibly true for the United States and its
education system.  Again, these are testable hypotheses and the OECD dummy allows us
to tap into these differences.
Statistically, we would also expect lower levels of change due to economic
freedom in OECD countries.  These countries have reached the top of both the
democracy and economic freedom scales (almost to the top of the Heritage Index).
Between the thirty OECD nations there is little variation in both democratic provisions
and market freedoms (see Table 1).  This is also true of the PQLI measure for these
states.  Explaining a relative constant is statistically difficult, so to the extent that we see
any impacts of small changes in the independent variables on the dependent variable in
these nations, the strength of the relationship must be high.
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean      Median Std. Dev.            Min. Max.
All Countries
PQLI 870 73.22        80.71    18.07    23.07 95.43
Econ. Freedom 854   2.88            2.9        .76                      1     4.7
Democracy 942   4.37   5      2.22             1                   7
GNP pp (in 1000s) 883   6.49          1.57           10.36      .097            50.73
Military Exp. 599 11.17   8      9.56                      0   53.8
OECD Countries
PQLI 125 91.41        92.79       3.69              77.37 95.43
Econ. Freedom 153   3.73              3.8       .354                  2.7     4.3
Democracy 163   6.77                 7       .782                     3        7
GNP pp (in 1000s) 163      23.36          25.27            12.16                2.67 50.73
Military Exp. 105   6.19              5.8       3.95                     0   18.8
Non-OECD Countries
PQLI 745 70.17          77.63            17.72    23.07 93.06
Econ. Freedom 701   2.70              2.7         .70                     1     4.7
Democracy 779   3.86               4       2.09                     1        7
GNP pp (in 1000s) 720   2.67            1.10       4.40              .0978            28.49
Military Exp. 494 12.22            9.15     10.06                     0 53.80
All mean differences between OECD and Non-OECD countries are statistically significant at the .01 level.
The author calculated all of the information in the table using data from The World Bank, The Heritage
Foundation, and Freedom House.   
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Operationalized Data and Hypotheses
Table 2 summarizes the explanatory variables and their hypothesized
relationships with basic human needs.  The following are some brief notes on the scales
for each measure:
1) PQLI is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 is the highest level of basic
needs attainment and 0 is the lowest.  See Appendix A for further details.
2) The Heritage Index of Economic Freedom is scaled from 1 (highest degree of
economic freedom) to 5 (lowest degree).   I re-scaled this measure for ease of
interpretation (5 = most free, 1 = least free).
3) The Freedom House measure of “political rights” has also been re-scaled for
interpretive reasons.  1 = least democratic and 7 = most democratic.  See
Appendix B for further details.
4) GNP per capita is measured in the thousands (ex. 4 = 4,000).
5) Military expenditures are shown as a percentage of the government budget.
6) Population is measured in the millions (ex. 4 = 4 million).
7) OECD membership is marked with a “0” for non-member states and a “1” for
members.
8) I include interactions of each independent variable with OECD membership in the
initial models to test for differences between the two groups.
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TABLE 2: Variables and Hypothesized Relationships with Basic Human Needs
Variable           Hypothesized Rel. Operationalization             Source
Basic Needs  N/A Physical Quality of        World Bank
Attainment Life Index (PQLI) *    
Economic Positive Index of Economic                           Heritage
Freedom Freedom       Foundation
Democracy                  Positive “Political Rights”                Freedom
 Measure              House
Wealth                         Positive  GNP per capita     World Bank
Military                 No hypothesized Military Expenditures         World Bank
Commitment              direction as a % of Gov. Exp.   
Population                   Negative Raw Population #            World Bank
OECD                         Positive “1”= Member, “0”=No** OECD
                                                 
* I used data from the World Bank to construct the PQLI scale.  I interpolated any missing values in the
components of the scale by taking the average of the previous and following years’ values.  I am confident
in this method because PQLI change across time was very small (PQLI lagged one period explains 99% of
the variance in PQLI).  The formula for constructing this scale was provided by Wes Milner through
Rhonda Callaway, however any errors in the PQLI index are my own.  Please see Appendix A for a
detailed account of the scale construction (Callaway 2001).
** Countries that became members during the time period of study were coded “0” for years before
membership and “1” after becoming official members.
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Table 3 reports the pair-wise coefficients for the main explanatory variables.  One
of the problems with the basic needs models involves probable multi-collinearity issues
using so many interacting political and economic factors.  Collinearity could bias the
standard error measures leading to problems with interpreting the coefficients
confidently.  These concerns are realized in the significant relationships shown in Table 2
between wealth, democracy, and economic freedom measures.  On the positive side, this
biases estimation in favor of Type II error (accepting a false null), which forces
significant relationships to show up in a more conservative test.  In short, any significant
relationships that show up in the results will have passed tougher “significance”
requirements because of the collinearity between the independent variables.  There is
another possible way to further differentiate the independent variable effects on PQLI.  I
will discuss this process in the results.
One more issue concerning model specification is that the proposed set of
variables do not cover the entire range of possible ‘causes’ of basic human needs
provision.  There are both purposeful and uncontrollable reasons for this.  First, I
consciously avoid over-specifying the model because the Heritage Foundation’s measure
incorporates so much economic policy.  The current model is trying to measure macro-
differences across nations, and to an extent across time, using macro-level causal
variables.  Because this analysis is the ‘first cut’ at testing the effects of these macro-
processes, I am not inclined to include other economic and political controls.  However,
this is certainly the path I encourage future scholarship in this area to take.  It would be
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very prudent for further analysts to test a fully specified model of basic needs provision
(including religiosity and regime change).
Contrary to my preference, the model is also under-specified for the simple reason
of ignorance.  As a new scholar to this field, I have certainly missed many of the intricate
workings of the process of basic needs provision (this is partly a function of the macro-
level approach as well).  This is not an empty qualification, as this under-specification is
a serious problem.  Presently, I will account for my ignorance in the research design.  I
will begin the next section with a brief description of this procedure and how it affects the
results.
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TABLE 3: Relationships Between Measures
PQLI   Econ. Freedom    Democracy           GNP pp
All Countries
PQLI 1.000
Econ. Freedom .5162***        1.000
Democracy .4635***       .6193***      1.000
GNP per capita .5214***       .6804***      .4799*** 1.000
OECD
PQLI 1.000
Econ. Freedom .5860***        1.000
Democracy .8608***       .4913***      1.000
GNP per capita .6570***       .6086***      .4340*** 1.000
Non-OECD
PQLI 1.000
Econ. Freedom .4028***        1.000
Democracy .3323***       .4822***        1.000
GNP per capita .4566***       .6208***          .1951*** 1.000
*** Significant at the .001 level.  Economic Freedom and Democracy have been recoded for ease of
interpretation.  The author calculated all information in the table using data from The World Bank, The




I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with fixed effects for years to
control for any variation due to time (Judge 1985).  This procedure essentially uses
dummy variables for each year (save one) and runs a joint F-test (Kmenta 1997, 418-419;
also see Chow 1960) to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the year dummies
are jointly ‘0.’  If there is something specific about the effects of time on the overall
model estimation then the F-statistic should be significant.  It is not (the corresponding t-
statistic = .130).  This test covers possible movements attributed to time (there was really
little concern with only four time points), but the more substantive model should also
control for possible effects due to country-specific variation.  I will discuss this later.
Lastly, assumptions of homoskedasticity are relaxed in these models because
theoretically, it is probable that measurement error is related to the specific country being
measured (Greene 2000).12  I account for the presence of non-random error by reporting
robust standard errors in all of the models.
The Basic Analysis of Subsistence Needs Attainment
Table 4 shows the first models for explaining basic needs provision.  I will
explore the results of this first design thoroughly in order to map out the method with
which I will interpret the remaining models.  These results are obtained through the OLS
procedure described above.  Model 1 is a modest attempt at the basic human needs model
                                                 
12 An examination of the residuals evidenced signs of high levels of heteroskedasticity.
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without testing for economic freedom.  In line with previous literature and theory, all of
the variables show significance with Gross National Product (GNP) per capita showing
the largest impact on the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI); one standard deviation
change in GNP per capita is equal to a 20 point increase in PQLI!
However more modest effects are seen when we take into account the differences
between countries in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and non-OECD members.  For non-OECD countries, the standard deviation
change is approximately $4,000 as opposed to $10,000, leaving the impact of wealth on
PQLI at a smaller level of about 8 points (this is still large!).  For OECD countries, the
impact of GNP per capita appears to cancel out the overall impacts of wealth relative to
non-OECD countries.  The negative coefficient is significant and is almost equal to the
positive coefficient for the model.  This trend continues throughout the analysis.  It
appears that the differences between OECD and non-OECD countries are significant and
large.  Secondly, the results for these three models show that democratic and economic
benefits are much smaller in developed nations than they are in under-developed ones.
Models 2 and 3 allow for a comparison of the GNP per capita variable and the
economic freedom variable.  In model 2 the Heritage measure’s coefficient is large,
significant, and in the right direction.  A single standard deviation change in economic
freedom has an impact on PQLI of 7 points.  This is modest compared to the impacts of
wealth, but still substantial relative to other variables in the models.
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TABLE 4: Explaining Basic Human Needs 1994-199713
Dependent Variable
PQLI Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Economic Freedom ------ 9.47*** 4.14**
(1.35) (1.61)
GNP per capita 2.09*** ------  1.62**
(In Thousands) (.206) (.242)
Democracy 1.66*** 2.03***                       1.69***
(.414) (.473) (.470)
Military Exp            -.347***           -.038                         -.271**
(.095) (.077) (.101)
Population  .012***                  .008*  .011**
(In millions) (.004) (.004) (.004)
OECD Mem            19.26*** 37.01*** 28.25***
(1.74) (5.58) (5.59)
OECD*Econ Frdm ------ -7.65*** -3.79*
(1.53) (1.72)
OECD*GNP PP -2.01*** ------ -1.53***
(.207) (.242)
OECD*Dem -1.16** -.825 -1.01*
(.474) (.557) (.547)
OECD*Mil Exp .233* -.168 .140
(.109) (.103) (.121)
OECD*Pop  -.007 -.001 -.007
(.005) (.006) (.005)
CONSTANT 61.35*** 36.33***                        50.73***
(2.38) (4.31) (4.93)
N 564 504 488
Adjusted R2 .45 .39 .46
                                                 
13 All models were estimated using OLS regression.  I report the estimated parameter coefficients with
robust standard errors in parentheses.  Two-tailed significance tests =  * .05 sig.     **.01 sig.    ***.001 sig.
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Model 3 is the better test of independent effects of economic freedom and wealth.
The full model controls for the impacts of each factor and estimates coefficients
independent of one another.  The results are consistent with the previous models:
Democracy is a positive and significant indicator of basic human needs attainment (one
std. dev. change ~  3 point increase in PQLI), Military expenditures as a proportion of the
government budget are negatively related to PQLI (1 std. dev. change ~ 2 point decrease
in PQLI), and OECD membership is a strong and positive indicator of PQLI, however
these benefits come with a price (discussed below).  The only variable that does not fit
the previous theory and literature is population.  It shows a positive relationship with
PQLI, but its impacts are tiny (one std. dev change ~ 1 point increase in PQLI).
More importantly, this ‘first cut’ at the data shows significant differences across
models between OECD and non-OECD nations.14  This empirical evidence is consistent
with the theoretical reasoning outlined earlier.  Namely, that basic needs provision in
developed and under-developed nations occurs at different rates and for different reasons.
I carry out a split-sample analysis in the next section to examine these differences more
carefully.         
OECD and non-OECD Split Sample Analysis
Table 5 shows the results of the separate analyses of OECD and non-OECD
nations.  The evidence is striking.  In developed countries, economic freedom does not
significantly affect the provision of basic human needs.  The strong relationship seen in
                                                 
14 A joint F-test on the interaction variables showed further evidence of the need for a split sample.  I
rejected the null of no joint relationship between these variables and PQLI (F statistic= 16.28, significant at
the .001 level).
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the earlier results is clearly coming from the under-developed countries, as the Heritage
index15 retains its strong association with PQLI.  In these nations one standard deviation
change in economic freedom results in approximately three points of increased basic
needs provision.  This relationship is similar to the strong wealth effects seen for non-
OECD nations; one standard deviation change in wealth is associated with a four-point
increase in PQLI.
Secondly, the amount of explained variance in OECD basic needs provision is
approximately eighty percent, while the non-OECD model explains only thirty percent of
the variation.  We should not get too carried away with this particular comparison as the
sample size is much different for both models, but it does correspond well with the
previous full sample analysis.  Specifically, OECD nations are relatively invariant in their
provision of subsistence needs, and that any observed movement is being driven by
democratic gains.  Wealth does have a significant effect on OECD needs provision, but
the magnitude of these effects are small compared with democracy.  Military
expenditures and population size retain their directions from the previous model,
providing evidence that their effects are consistent in both samples.
As noted previously, there are reasons to think that my model suffers from under-
specification and multi-collinearity problems.  If this is the case, then it is prudent to try
and address these issues as much as possible.  For the purposes of this analysis, I am only
concerned with these problems as they affect economic freedom, therefore I would like to
                                                 
15 The Index of Economic Freedom, Copyright The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC,
http://www.heritage.org/index/2002.
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construct more conservative tests for this variable to see if it retains its significant
relationship with basic needs attainment.  I will address the under-specification problem
TABLE 5: Explaining Basic Human Needs: Split Sample 16
Dependent Variable
PQLI OECD Countries    Non-OECD
Economic Freedom .316 4.13**
(.592) (1.61)
GNP per capita .088***                   1.62***
(In Thousands) (.018) (.241)
Democracy 2.74*** 1.69***
(.281) (.470)
Military Exp        -.116* -.270**
(.060) (.101)
Population        .004                .011**




Adjusted R2 .81 .30
                                                 
16 All models were estimated using OLS regression.  I report the estimated parameter coefficients with
robust standard errors in parentheses.  Two-tailed significance tests =  * .05 sig.     **.01 sig.    ***.001 sig.
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first, as the multi-collinearity problem biases the previous tests against my hypotheses;
these are tests that the variable has already passed.
To test for a relationship between economic freedom and subsistence needs, I
constructed a model of ignorance; the results of which are shown in Table 6.  This model
includes dummies for every single country in the sample and controls for their
independent effects on PQLI.  Statistically, this model represents the most conservative
test for independent economic, wealth, and democratic effects.  It filters out all of the
variation due to the uniqueness of each country, leaving little room for other independent
variables to show their effects.  As Table 5 highlights, most of the explanatory variables
in the model drop out.  The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients in this model are
unreliable, but despite all of the endogenous control, the economic freedom and wealth
measures remain consistently significant.
Also of note, is that the results are consistent with all of the previous models.
Economic freedom is not significantly associated with PQLI in OECD nations, but is a
strong indicator in under-developed countries.  These results are clear evidence that the
Heritage measure is rich with information regarding the effects of economic policy
choices on basic needs outcomes.  It is possible however, that the majority of its impacts
on PQLI are masked by its close relationship with GNP per capita.  Table 7 presents the
results of a procedure that may enlighten us as to what this relationship is.
As noted earlier, liberal theorists argue that free markets stimulate investment and
growth, which indicates that economic freedom may in fact cause changes in GNP per
capita. By including both of these variables in the full models described above, the wealth
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TABLE 6: Explaining PQLI: Controlling for ‘Country’17
Dependent Variable
PQLI OECD Countries    Non-OECD
Economic Freedom 1.14 .63**
(.839) (.252)
GNP per capita .23*                       .33**
(In Thousands) (.098) (.11)
Democracy  -.049 .079
(.355) (.08)
Military Exp       .007       -.008   
(.066) (.025)
Population        .063                .053***
(In millions) (.053) (.013)
Constant 79.90*** 65.64***
(4.69) (.909)
N  95 393
Adjusted R2 .98 .99
                                                 
17 All models were estimated using OLS regression.  I report the estimated parameter coefficients with
robust standard errors in parentheses.  Country dummies are not reported.  Two-tailed significance tests =
* .05 sig.     **.01 sig.    ***.001 sig.
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measure may be taking away (‘explaining’) some of the relationship between PQLI and
economic freedom, thus decreasing the estimated coefficients for economic freedom in
all of the models.  I test this hypothesis (H0 = there is no causal relationship between
GNP per capita and economic freedom) by regressing GNP per capita on the Heritage
rating of each observation.  Statistically, the variations not explained by the economic
freedom measure (the residuals of this regression) are no longer collinear with the
Heritage Index (by definition).  Using the residuals of this regression in the full models
should thus purge them of their multi-collinearity properties (at least for these two
variables).
TABLE 7: Explaining GNP per Capita18
Dependent Variable
GNP per Capita OECD Countries    Non-OECD
Economic Freedom 20.97*** 4.39***
(2.02) (.411)
Constant            -55.39*** -9.43***
(7.23) (1.05)
N 153 644
Adjusted R2 .35 .38
                                                 
18 Two-tailed significance tests =  * .05 sig.     **.01 sig.    ***.001 sig
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The results are in line with the theory in the development field.  Economic
freedom is associated with significant increases in wealth in both OECD and non-OECD
countries.  In OECD countries, one standard deviation change in economic freedom will
increase GNP per capita by about $15,000.  This is an extremely large level of change,
and may highlight the limits of this approach; nevertheless the effects in non-OECD
countries are just as large.  A one standard deviation change in economic freedom will
result in a GNP per capita change of nearly one standard deviation (about $3,000).  The
next step is to use the residuals from this regression in our full models discussed earlier.
I must note that this procedure has many detractors.  Because of this, I only
provide the results as a general picture of what the economic freedom variable is capable
of.  I do not support the use of these results in any capacity other than to highlight future
study in this area; in the end, I do not know the effects of the behavior of these residuals,
and thus my findings may be flawed.  With this in mind, Table 8 shows that when the
collinearity between economic freedom and GNP per capita are ‘purged,’ the estimated
economic freedom coefficient explodes.  In both samples, the variable is significant and
large (perhaps too large).  I am not comfortable enough with the methods behind this
approach to continue this line of inquiry further, but the results shown here are very
suggestive.
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TABLE 8: Explaining PQLI Using GNP Residuals19
Dependent Variable
PQLI OECD Countries    Non-OECD
Economic Freedom 2.16** 38.08***
(.674) (4.58)
GNP per capita     .088***                       .1.62***
(Residuals) (.018) (.24)
Democracy 2.74***        1.69***
(.28) (.47)
Military Exp       -.116*       -.27**   
(.06) (.1)
Population         .004                .012**




Adjusted R2 .81 .30
                                                 




I have covered a lot of ground in this study and do not want to prolong the
inevitable end of this paper.  I will summarize my intentions and results succinctly.  First,
I wanted to test whether or not economic policy choices had any affect on basic needs
outcomes.  The more a government regulates the economy (to an extent), the less likely
investment in human capital will take place.  The market needs educated and healthy
producers, workers, and consumers.  These demand goods should find suppliers as long
as the government does not block their provision by limiting investment.
Foremost, as the title suggests, I wanted to take the human rights literature beyond
simple Gross National Product (GNP)/Gross Domestic Product (GDP) wealth measures.
I do not take past scholars to task for including GNP per capita controls in their models.
Every model of basic needs provision should include this variable.  Instead I argue for the
inclusion of a general measure for economic freedom.  Bits and pieces of this argument
are found in the literature, but no scholarly study that I am aware of uses a general index
of economic freedom to measure the outcomes of subsistence needs.  I argue that it is a
valuable tool that needs to be explored within the framework of the field.
It appears as though the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom20 is a good
measure of government control over the marketplace.  It is highly correlated with both
democracy and wealth, and is a solid predictor of basic needs provision.  When property
                                                 
20 The Index of Economic Freedom, Copyright The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC,
http://www.heritage.org/index/2002.
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rights are protected, when contracts are enforced, and when governments generally
protect economic freedoms, investment seems to release latent capacity for nations to
provide subsistence level needs for themselves.  This paper did not address this
theoretical link satisfactorily, but in opening the black box of wealth, I appear to have
uncovered the black box of economic freedom.  Perhaps measures like the Heritage Index
can be used to test ideas about how this provision occurs.
More importantly, it is possible that these measures can be used to test when basic
needs attainment occurs and conversely, when economic freedom transforms into
economic discrimination and oppression.  Undercurrents of this idea are found in this
analysis.  Developed countries appear to have outgrown their need for more open markets
(contrary to Libertarian think-tanks like the Heritage Foundation).  I repeatedly found no
relationship between economic freedom and basic human needs provision when
controlling for member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).  Neo-Marxists might argue (and rightly so) that these results
indicate that developed countries are getting healthier and richer because of increased
wealth and democracy, not open markets.  Further analysis using the Heritage measure
may prove fruitful in this area.
In under-developed countries, the results are clear; more economic freedom is
associated with more basic needs provision.  It is more than likely that other mechanisms
are at work in this relationship, but liberal theory and the results presented here show that
open markets can have positive impacts in even the poorest countries.  The Heritage
Foundation offers their measure in a disaggregate form (broken up into ten categories),
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and this is where I think the most progress can be made in future scholarship using this
measure.  Are ‘property right protections’ driving the aggregate index, or is it foreign
investment?  Does central bank control hurt or help a new economy?  Do tariff controls
protect or damage new markets?  These questions can all be addressed using a single,
consistent measure like the Index of Economic Freedom.  For human rights scholars who
are interested in outcomes rather than outputs, this is indeed a valuable new tool.         
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Appendix A: Measuring the PQLI21
Morris' (1979) original computation of the index included the early 1970s, as well as, indices for
males and females for the years 1950, 1964, and 1970 (Morris 1979). This index was updated by Morris in
1996 and included the years 1960, 1981, 1985, and 1990.  The World Development Indicator database was
used to gather the initial data for the measures of life expectancy, illiteracy rate, and infant mortality. This
source provided a comprehensive amount of data, particularly the rates of illiteracy.
I computed the PQLI scores for the years of this study using the formula provided by Wes Milner
through Rhonda Callaway.  These data were compared to the Milner (1998) dataset and the Callaway
dataset (provided by author). Upon gathering as much missing data as possible, the three separate measures
were converted to a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing the worst performance and 100 representing the
best performance. The three indexed measures are then combined into the Physical Quality of Life Index
(PQLI) using the formula created by Morris (1979, 1996).
The computation of PQLI includes a measure for infant mortality per thousand live births (IMR).
According to Morris (1996, 3), “improvements in the infant mortality component reflect social
improvements inside the home, particularly the well-being of women.” This infant mortality rate uses 250
per 1,000 live births as the worst possible performance with 0 per thousand reflecting the best performance.
Each country's performance is converted using the following formula:
250-IMR/2.50.
The measure for life expectancy at age one (LE1) assumes that 38 years is the worst performance and 85
years is the best performance. The resulting index for each country is derived from the formula
LE1 -38/0.47.
However, the data available discloses infant mortality at birth (LE0). Thus, the conversion formula to
obtain the measure for life expectancy at age one (LE1) is as follows:
LE1 = LE0 - 1 + Q0(1-K0)/1-Q0
Where Q0 is the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births; K0 is the average survival period during the first
year. This survival period is assumed to be .03 year; LE0 is life expectancy at birth; and LE1 is life
expectancy at age one.
The original raw data on literacy rates was actually given as illiteracy rates. Thus, the data had to be
converted simply by subtracting the raw data from 100. After each individual measure is converted to a
scale from 0 to 100, the composite index is calculated by simply averaging the sum of the three
components. Each component is thus weighted equally.
                                                 
21 Thanks to Rhonda Callaway for this appendix.  I have changed minor parts of this description, but for the
large part it remains intact from Callaway’s work (Callaway 2001).
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Appendix B: The Freedom House Measure of Political Rights22
Political Rights Checklist
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected
through free and fair elections?
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and
honest tabulation of ballots?
4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise
and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic
possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through
elections?
7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian
parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-
determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal
consensus in the decision-making process?
Additional discretionary
Political Rights questions:
A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the
system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy,
and allow the right to petition the ruler?
B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic
composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political
balance in favor of another group?
                                                 
22 Copyright Freedom House, Washington, DC, http://www.freedomhouse.org/.    For more on the Freedom
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